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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1   Introduction  
Money laundering (hereafter ML) is a multidisciplinary topic which has become important since 
the late 1980s.1 The term ‘laundering’ literally means ‘washing’ or ‘removing dirt’.2 It has been 
defined as the conversion of criminal income into assets that cannot be traced back to the 
underlying crime.3 Criminals use ML as a way of keeping control over the proceeds of crime and 
to provide, ultimately, a cover for their income and wealth. ML occurs every time any transaction 
takes place, regardless of whether it involves any form of property or benefit, whether tangible 
or not tangible, which is derived from criminal activity.4 
ML is regulated at the global, regional and national levels. To combat ML and other financial 
crimes, Malawi enacted the Financial Crimes Act (hereafter FCA).5 The FCA establishes the 
Financial Intelligence Authority (hereafter FIA) as an institution whose objectives include 
collecting financial intelligence regarding suspicious transactions.6  
                                                          
1 Unger B & Linde DVD Research Handbook on Money Laundering (2013) 3, Edward Elgar Publishing  
                Limited, Cheltenham, United Kingdom. 
2  Mtonga E M A Critical Appraisal of the Current Anti-Money Laundering Laws of Malawi with Specific Focus  
                on Trust (2015) 1, unpublished LLM Research Paper, University of the Western Cape. Mtonga quotes 
 Serafini J ‘’Money Laundering’’ (2004) 41 American Criminal Law Review at 887. Available at  
   http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uwc.ac.za/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=168966&sr=TITLE% 
 (last visited on 31 March 2015).    
3  Reuter P & Truman EM Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering (2004) 1, Institute 
 for International Economics, Washington DC, United States of America. 
4  Hopton D Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for all Business (2009) 1-2, second edition, Gower 
 Publishing Limited, England. 
5  No 14 of 2017.  
6  Section 3(1) of the FCA. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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1.2  Background to the Study 
Before the FCA came into force in the year 2017, the FIA was known as the Financial Intelligence 
Unit (hereafter FIU), which started its operations in July 2007. It was established in terms of 
Section 11 of the Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act 
(hereafter ML Act)7 which has been repealed under section 141(1) of the FCA. 
Since its establishment in 2007, the FIU was housed in the Reserve Bank of Malawi (hereafter 
RBM) building in Lilongwe8 where it analysed cases relating to the illegal remittance of funds 
through the use of false importation documents.9 The FIU functioned under a comprehensive 
framework. Despite its short history, the Malawi FIU joined the Egmont Group, the international 
association of FIUs. It became the eighth of 153 countries in Africa to attain membership. 10   
Malawi’s FIU analysed reports sent to it, as well as information sourced from databases of other 
institutions to gather financial intelligence aimed at detecting and investigating ML, terrorist 
financing and other financial crimes.11  
                                                          
7 Chapter 8:07 of the Laws of Malawi of 2006. 
8  Musonda S & Muhammed H "The role of Financial Intelligence Units in combating money laundering: A  
    Comparative Analysis of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi" (2011) 15, Journal of Money Laundering 
 Control. Available at www.emaralddinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/13685201211194754  
 (last visited on 4 March 2018).  
9   Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016), 6. Available at  
     http://www.fiumalawi.gov.mw/FIU%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%20FOR%202015%20-%202016.pdf  
   (last visited on 5 March 2018).   
10  Musonda S & Muhammed H (2011: 21).  
11  Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 8). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The Malawian FIU was set up as an administrative agency, whose function was not to investigate 
or prosecute ML or other financial crimes. It disseminated financial intelligence to law 
enforcement agencies (hereafter LEAs) for investigation and prosecution.12 
The FIU was mandated to share information with foreign FIUs for fighting ML.13 It maintained a 
good working relationship with other domestic agencies through various Memoranda of 
Understanding to ensure the sharing of information to help accomplish its obligations.  In 
addition, it liaised with LEAs during the prosecution of ML cases. For example, the FIU continued 
to provide financial intelligence to the LEAs regarding the investigation and prosecution of cases 
related to Malawi’s notorious Cashgate scandal, which involved the systematic looting of public 
money and corruption at Capital Hill, the seat of Government.14  
To encourage financial institutions to take ownership of implementing the anti-money laundering 
(hereafter AML) laws and regulations, the FIU ran training programmes for various reporting 
entities at their request. To promote AML awareness among the public, it distributed leaflets, 
posted articles on its website on key developments in AML efforts, and used billboards in 
Malawi’s cities of Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu to advertise its existence and why it was 
created.15 A key component of its strategy was to coordinate its work with that of other domestic 
units, as well as with its international counterparts.16 
                                                          
12 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 7). 
13 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 8). 
14 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 9). 
15 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 14). 
16 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 17). 
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Despite its successes, the FIU encountered hurdles that hampered its progress. For example, it 
was poorly funded, which impacted negatively on its operational effectiveness in matters such 
as educating the public on AML measures and conducting on-site examination of financial 
institutions.  The FIU operated from rented premises, and it was usually in arrears in paying the 
rent.17 
1.3  Background Statement to the Research Problem 
In 2008, the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (hereafter ESAAMLG) 
published its Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Malawi on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism.18 The report made several findings and recommendations 
on Malawi’s repealed law, that is, the ML Act which dealt with ML and with the combating of the 
crime of financing acts of terrorism.  
Malawi’s AML framework was revised radically as a result of the report. For instance, during the 
period that the ML Act was in operation, ESAAMLG found that Malawi did not have a legislative 
or regulatory framework to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions (hereafter 
UNSCR’s) 1267 and 1373. It was also noted that the authorities were not disseminating the 
UNSCR 1267 lists to financial institutions. However, certain provisions in the ML Act could have 
been utilised to freeze terrorist assets, although this would have required a longer judicial 
process to accomplish. This was found to be inconsistent with the UNSCR’s requirement to freeze 
the assets without delay. It was therefore recommended that Malawi establish an appropriate 
                                                          
17 Malawi FIU Annual Report (2015/2016: 21). 
18 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group Anti Money Laundering & Combating the  
 Financing of Terrorism (2008) 4, Mutual Evaluation Report Executive Summary, Republic of Malawi. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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legislative or regulatory framework for the freezing of terrorist assets.19 This recommendation by 
ESAAMLG was implemented under Part VI of the newly-enacted 2017 FCA, which provides for 
civil forfeiture, seizure, detention, freezing and preservation of assets.  
ESAAMLG also found that Malawi had no LEA specifically charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that ML offences are properly investigated. However, the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(hereafter ACB) and the Malawi Police Service (hereafter MPS) had already begun to consider 
aspects of ML as part of their day-to-day investigations. Moreover, the FIU disseminated reports 
to LEAs. 20  Under section 5(c) of the newly-enacted FCA, the FIA has the authority to investigate 
any matter in relation to the implementation of the Act.  
ESAAMLG further found that Malawi had no statutory or regulatory framework dealing with shell 
banks. While the ML Act did not regulate shell banks, a shell bank could be set up subject to the 
discretionary issuing of a licence.  ESAAMLG recommended that Malawi should consider 
specifically prohibiting the establishment of shell banks.21 As a result, Section 30(2) of the FCA 
presently prohibits correspondent banking relationships with shell banks.  
Although Malawi now has a more improved FIA in view of the newly enacted FCA, this study will 
argue that there is much that still needs to be done to make the FIA more effective in combating 
ML. For example, the newly enacted FCA does not grant the FIA the express powers to prosecute 
                                                          
19  ESAAMLG report on Malawi (2008: 6). 
20 ESAAMLG report on Malawi (2008: 6). 
21  ESAAMLG report on Malawi (2008: 8). 
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cases of ML besides the investigative role provided under section 5(c) of the FCA. This study will 
contend that lack of express prosecutorial authority for the FIA hampers its fight against ML.  
1.4  Study Hypothesis  
The study proceeds from the assumption that the effectiveness of the FIA in fighting ML does not 
solely rely on the availability of material resources for its day-to-day operations, but depends also 
on the degree of independence enjoyed by the institution. The assumption is that, for the 
institution to operate effectively, its employees should be able to work free of outside 
interference that would compromise its integrity and public image. The potential danger of 
political interference is real, given the fact that the Director General, who heads the FIA, is a 
political appointee. The chances that the appointee might cherish his or her indebtedness to the 
President more than any other work-related consideration can therefore not be ignored. Thus, 
in deciding whether to investigate suspicious ML transactions, it is likely that the Director General 
would not want to incur the displeasure of the President unto whom he or she is beholden. In 
effect, this means that external considerations violate the spirit and the letter of the law. 
1.5  Research Questions  
This research paper seeks to answer the following three questions: 
a. Does the lack of express powers to prosecute under the Malawi’s FCA hamper the FIU in 
combating ML?  
b. How does the Malawian FIA deal with the various typologies of ML? 
c. Is there any possibility of executive or political influence over the Malawian FIA which 
would undermine the institution’s ability to combat ML? 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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1.6  Research Methodology  
This is a pure desktop study. It will compare Malawi’s AML laws with those of South Africa and 
Namibia in so far as they relate to the title of this work. The comparison arises from the fact that, 
like Malawi, the two comparators share three important characteristics. First, they are all 
common law jurisdictions. Second, they all belong to the Southern African Development 
Community (hereafter SADC) countries. Third, all three countries are members of ESAAMLG. The 
comparison will concentrate on the key features of FIUs, which are their respective mandates, 
powers, structures, and appointment procedures for the heads of the FIUs.  
1.7  Scope of the Study 
The study will confine itself to looking into the enabling laws governing FIUs in the countries 
compared, but with the emphasis on the Malawian law as Malawi is the focus of this paper. In 
addition, the paper will measure the effectiveness of the Malawian FIA against the standards set 
by the Egmont Group, which is an international group of FIUs that meets regularly to enhance 
their cooperation in information exchange, training and sharing of expertise. 
1.8  Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter One  
Chapter One introduces the topic and gives an overview of the study.  
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two briefly looks at the stages of ML and the various types of FIUs that exist in the 
international community. Most importantly, the chapter looks at how the Financial Action Task 
Force (hereafter FATF), which is the international standard setting AML body based in Paris, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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enforces its standards. The chapter also discusses the two observer members that attend the 
FATF meetings, namely, the IMF and the Wolfsberg Group, which will be briefly described below. 
The chapter also briefly discusses the Egmont Group. Finally, the chapter will look at the 
ESAAMLG, which is an AML regional grouping of which Malawi is a member. 
Chapter Three 
This chapter focuses on the legal and institutional framework of Malawi’s FIA and its mandate 
under the FCA in the fight against ML. Since the study attempts to measure the effectiveness of 
Malawi’s FIA against that of South Africa and Namibia, the paper will also study the respective 
enactments of the latter two countries, namely, South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
(hereafter SAFICA) and Namibia’s Financial Intelligence Centre Act (hereafter NFICA). 
Chapter Four 
This chapter will study the different typologies of ML that the Malawian FIA has so far dealt with 
under both domestic law and international law.  
Chapter Five 
This chapter, the concluding one, will point out the main weaknesses in Malawi’s FIA, especially 
with regard to executive interference in the work of the FIA, and will recommend what could be 
done about the flaws. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN 
THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING  
2.1  Introduction 
In 1989, the Finance Ministers of the G7 countries, which constitute the world’s most developed 
economies, established the FATF, a body created to combat ML. Its mandate was “to assess the 
results of cooperation already undertaken, to prevent the utilisation of the banking system and 
financial institutions for ML, and to consider additional preventive efforts in this field, including 
the adaptation of the legal and regulatory systems to enhance the multilateral judicial 
assistance.”22  
This chapter briefly introduces the stages of money laundering which FIUs encounter in money 
laundering cases. It also discusses the various types of existing FIUs and how the FATF enforces 
its Recommendations, particularly in relation to FIUs.  In addition, the chapter takes a brief look 
at the Egmont Group of FIUs and ESAAMLG.  
2.2  Stages of Money Laundering 
2.2.1 Placement 
Placement is usually the first of three steps in laundering illicit proceeds. It involves changing the 
money derived from criminal activities into a more portable and less suspicious form, then 
                                                          
22 World Bank Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: a Comprehensive Training  
 Guide, (2009) 23, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818  
 Washington DC. 
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introducing the proceeds into the mainstream financial system. It is the most difficult and 
vulnerable step, because most illegal activity generates profits in the form of cash, and cash is 
bulky, difficult to conceal. Furthermore, carrying large amounts of money attracts the suspicion 
of bank tellers and casino employees.23 
Placement requires finding a solution to the problem of how to blend the illicit proceeds into the 
lawful financial system. The methods used to do so know no bounds, and may vary from simply 
placing the illicit cash into cash-intensive businesses to converting the cash into negotiable 
instruments such as cashier cheques or money orders.24  
 
2.2.2 Layering 
Layering is the second of the three steps of laundering illicit funds. It involves making a series of 
financial transactions that, in their frequency, complexity and volume, often resemble legitimate 
financial activity. Typically, layering involves the wire transfer or movement of funds placed in 
the financial or banking system by way of numerous accounts in an attempt to hide the criminal 
provenance of the proceeds. The most common method of layering is to wire transfer funds 
through offshore-banking havens. Once the funds are out of the country and are in countries 
with strong bank-secrecy laws, their origins become even more obscure. The difficulty of tracing 
the source of the criminal money is compounded by the various complex devices available to the 
                                                          
23  Richards JR Transnational Criminal Organisations, Cybercrime, and Money Laundering: A Handbook for  
 Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators (1999) 47-48, CRC Press LLC, Washington, 
 D.C United States of America. 
24  Richards JR (1999: 48). 
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launderer to confound investigators. The sheer volume of wire transfers adds to the problem of 
tracking the origins. 25 
2.2.3 Integration  
Integration involves the integration of the layered funds into the legal economy by using a variety 
of financial instruments, such as letters of credit, bonds, securities, bank notes, bills of lading and 
guarantees. Some of the largest seizures of laundered funds occur where integration fails and 
the entire account is or accounts are seized.26 
2.3  FIUs 
Given the sophisticated ways of laundering criminal money, the need for a modern AML strategy 
has become widely accepted internationally. A critical component of this strategy are FIUs. The 
Egmont Group, an informal international gathering of FIUs, defines an FIU as “a central, national 
agency responsible for receiving (and as permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to 
a competent authority, disclosures of financial information concerning proceeds of crime and 
potential financing of terrorism; or required by national legislation or regulation, to counter ML 
and terrorism financing.” 27 
FIUs increase their probability of success by constantly updating technology, hiring personnel 
with relevant work experience and training them to keep up with the latest trends in financial 
                                                          
25 Richards JR (1999: 49). 
26  Richards JR (1999: 49-50).  
27  Musonda S, Muhammed H (2011: 112-113). 
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crime.28 FIUs have been described as ideally suited to provide reporting entities with training and 
guidance to reinforce their participation in counteracting ML. Simonova states that FIUs are: 
“In an ideal position of collecting valuable data on money laundering techniques from all over 
the world. At the national level, they are a link between financial institutions and law 
enforcement agencies having useful contacts to each side. There is no other institution which 
is better suited for educating financial institutions in preventing and detecting money 
laundering… It would be more appropriate if national FIU’S took a more active role in 
educating financial institutions in anti-money laundering law techniques through regular 
publication of updated typologies and other guidance.”29 
2.3.1 Types of FIUs 
FIUs differ from one another in structure and reporting authority. There are three types of FIUs.  
2.3.1.1  Administrative-Type FIUs 
Administrative-type FIUs are usually part of an existing structure, under the supervision of an 
administration or an agency other than the law-enforcement or judicial authorities. They 
sometimes constitute a separate agency, placed under the substantive supervision of a 
government ministry. The main rationale for such an arrangement is to establish a link between 
the financial sector (and, more generally, entities and professionals subject to reporting 
                                                          
28 Souza JD Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Examining the performance of Financial  
   Intelligence Units (2012) 143, CRC Press, United States of America.  
29 Alhosani W Anti-Money Laundering: A Comparative and Critical Analysis of the UK and UAE’S Financial   
   Intelligence Units (2016) 24, Macmillan Publishers Ltd, London. Quoting Simonova A, “The Risk-Based 
 Approach to Anti-Money Laundering: Problems and Solutions” (2011) 346, 14(4), Journal of Money 
 Laundering Control. 
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obligations) and the law-enforcement authorities in charge of financial crime investigations and 
prosecutions.30   
2.3.1.2 Law-Enforcement-Type FIUs 
The law-enforcement type FIU is an FIU which is part of a law-enforcement agency.  It is easier 
to establish as it does not require a new entity and a new legal and administrative framework. 
This type of FIU is close to other LEAs, such as a financial crimes unit. The law-enforcement type 
FIU enables the institution to benefit from the expertise and sources of information of the other 
LEAs. In return, information received by the FIU is accessed more easily by LEAs and could be 
used in any investigations. Exchange of information is expedited through the use of existing 
national and international criminal information exchange networks.31   
2.3.1.3 Judicial or Prosecutorial-Type FIUs 
These fall under a country’s judiciary. They are suited to jurisdictions where strong bank secrecy 
laws make it necessary to seek the help of judicial or prosecutorial authorities to secure the 
cooperation of financial institutions. Such an arrangement is typically found in civil law 
jurisdictions, where the public prosecutors are part of the judicial system.32   
                                                          
30  World Bank Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (2004) 10, International Monetary Fund Publication  
Services, Washington, D.C. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf (last visited on 
30 July 2018). 
31  World Bank (2004:13-14). 
32  D’Souza J Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Examining the performance of Financial  
     Intelligence Units (2012) XII, Taylor & Francis/CRC Press, Boca Raton, Introduction at XII. 
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2.3.1.4   Hybrid FIUs 
Hybrid FIUs combine elements of the FIUs described above in order to benefit from their 
advantageous elements.33 For example, some FIUs combine the features of administrative-type 
and law-enforcement-type FIUs.34 
2.4  International Bodies Regulating FIUs in the fight against Money Laundering 
2.4.1 The FATF 
The FATF began its work in Paris in 1990 and since then it has produced the most comprehensive 
set of AML standards, known as the FATF Forty Recommendations. As more countries accepted 
the FATF Recommendations, they became the global minimum standard for an effective AML 
system.35  
In 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the FATF adopted Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. The first eight were adopted in October 2001, and the 
ninth in October 2004. In 2012, the FATF introduced risk management as its first 
Recommendation. The revisions of 2012 combined the Nine Special Recommendations into the 
40 Recommendations. 
Besides the FATF, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime36 
(hereafter the Palermo Convention) also contains provisions that target ML.  
                                                          
33 D’Souza J (2012: XII). 
34  World Bank (2004: 17). 
35 World Bank (2009: 23). 
36 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols thereto, United 
 Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2004) Vienna, United Nations, New York. Available at  
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Apart from the Palermo Convention which deals with the criminalisation of the proceeds of illicit 
drug trafficking, but which makes no mention at all of the term ‘money laundering’, there are no 
instruments dealing with AML at international level, or rather a world treaty, that deals with 
international AML law.  
The FATF does not administer a treaty, and its Recommendations are not legally binding, for they 
are classed as soft law. The FATF is an international task force that functions as an inter-
governmental policy-making body with the specific purpose to establish international standards, 
and develop and promote policies, both at the national and international levels, to combat ML 
and terrorist financing. The FATF reviews its operations regularly.37 
The FATF has four core functions: setting standards, ensuring their implementation in member 
countries, studying the techniques and typologies of ML and terrorist financing, and conducting 
outreach activities that aim to spread the Recommendations globally.38  
2.4.2 Functions of the FATF 
2.4.2.1 Setting Standards 
The first product of the FATF was the first edition of the Forty Recommendations in 1990, which 
provided the first comprehensive international AML framework. Throughout its history, the 
standard-setting function continued to be very important. FATF standard-setting activities are 
not confined to setting the general standard in the form of broad recommendations. The group 
                                                          
   https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organisedcrime/United_Nations_Conventi
 on_against_Transnational_Organised_Crime_and_the_Protocols_thereto.pdf  (last visited on 9 July 2018).  
37  World Bank (2009: 23-24).  
38  World Bank (2009: 23-24).  
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continually issues interpretive notes and guidance on best practices aimed at promoting the 
uniform implementation of the Recommendations across the world.39 
The standard-setting role of the FATF was acknowledged internationally when the Boards of the 
World Bank and the IMF agreed to recognise the FATF Forty Recommendations as the standard 
for combatting ML. The FATF has the mandate to instruct financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions to take steps to use the Recommendations in their activities.40  
2.4.2.2    Ensuring Implementation  
The FATF not only sets standards to combat ML, but also implements rigorous internal review 
procedures that aim to ensure that countries comply with its Recommendations.41 The FATF uses 
two types of review mechanisms, namely, self-assessment exercises and mutual evaluation.42  
The self-assessment exercise is based on a standard questionnaire designed by the FATF and used 
by its members to report on their AML systems on an annual basis. The FATF secretariat then 
uses the answers to compile reports on the level of compliance with the Recommendations and 
on the specific successes and failures in each reporting country’s system.43  
A mutual evaluation consists in one country’s AML laws and policies being evaluated by a team 
of experts drawn from other member countries. The team uses a standard questionnaire and is 
guided by a pre-set list of issues in assessing the level of the examined country’s compliance with 
                                                          
39 World Bank (2009: 24-25). 
40  World Bank (2009: 25). 
41 World Bank (2009: 25). 
42 World Bank (2009: 25) 
43 World Bank (2009: 25). 
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FATF standards. Based on the reports compiled, the assessed countries are required to rectify 
shortcomings in their AML laws. Each evaluated country is also given an opportunity to respond 
to the first draft of the report before it is published.44 
2.4.2.3   Studying the Techniques and Typologies of Money Laundering  
The third main role of the FATF is to provide a forum for sharing information on ML techniques 
and typologies, and best policies and measures to counter them. The FATF uses multidisciplinary 
experts who meet in working groups to study and analyse the latest laundering methods. The 
FATF then publishes a typology based on this information. “Typology” in this case means the 
systematic classification of crimes with a common trait. These typologies are based on the crimes 
experienced by member countries.45   
2.4.2.4   Conducting Outreach Activities 
The FATF attaches much importance to publicising its work and reaching out not just to the public 
and governments, but also to institutions and professional people that are vulnerable as conduits 
for ML, such as financial institutions and certain designated non-financial businesses and 
professions.46 
2.4.3 The FATF’s Recommendations on FIUs 
The FATF Recommendations set out the essential measures that countries should have in place 
to identify the risks and develop policies and domestic coordination among institutions. 
Countries are advised to apply preventive measures for the financial sector, including other 
                                                          
44  World Bank (2009: 25). 
45  World Bank (2009: 26). 
46 World Bank (2009: 26). 
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designated sectors, and to establish powers and responsibilities for the competent investigative, 
law enforcement and supervisory authorities. Countries are also tasked with other institutional 
measures that help to enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership 
information of legal persons and arrangements, and to facilitate international cooperation.47 
Recommendation 29 of the FATF provides that countries should establish an FIU that serves as a 
national centre for the receipt and analysis of suspicious transaction reports (hereafter STRs); 
and other information relevant to ML. FIUs are also required to disseminate the results of the 
analysis of the information that they receive.48  
The FATF further requires FIUs to obtain additional information from reporting entities, and that 
it should have access on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information it requires to undertake its functions properly.49 
The FATF emphasises the need for the FIU to conduct operational analysis, which uses available 
and obtainable information to identify specific targets, to follow the trail of particular activities 
or transactions, and to determine links between those targets and possible proceeds of crime.50  
The FATF also recommends that a country’s FIU should be able to disseminate, spontaneously 
and upon request, information and the results of its analysis to relevant competent authorities, 
and should use dedicated, secured and protected channels for the dissemination.51 
                                                          
47 The FATF Recommendations International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the  
      Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (2016) 7, Paris Cedex 16, France. 
48  FATF Methodology for Assessing Technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the  
     Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems (2013-2017) 75, Paris, France.   
49 FATF (2013-2017: 75). 
50 FATF (2013-2017: 75). 
51 FATF (2013-2017: 76). 
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In addition, the FATF also recommends that an FIU protects its information by having rules in 
place governing the security and confidentiality of information, including procedures for 
handling, storage, dissemination, and protection of and access to information. The FATF also 
requires the FIU staff members to have the security clearance levels and understanding of their 
responsibilities in handling and disseminating sensitive and confidential information; and also 
ensuring that there is limited access to its facilities and information, including information 
technology systems.52 
The FATF lays much store by an FIU being operationally independent and autonomous by having 
the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the autonomous decision to 
analyse, request or forward or disseminate specific information.53 
2.4.4  The Effect of Non-Compliance with FATF Standards 
Although the FATF’s Recommendations have no formal legal status, they have significant 
practical force. The FATF monitors member and non-member states’ compliance with its 
Recommendations. A jurisdiction that fails to comply with the FATF’s Recommendation may, 
after a period of dialogue and engagement, face adverse reputational consequences.54 
According to Ben Saul, the FATF can publicly urge all states to advise their financial institutions 
to consider the risks posed by various financial dealings.55 In February 2011, the FATF published 
                                                          
52 FATF (2013-2017: 76). 
53 FATF (2013-2017: 76). 
54 Jenkins D, Jacobsen A & Henriksen A The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law (2016) at 124, New 
 York: Oxford University Press. 
55  Jenkins D, Jacobsen A, Henriksen A (2016: 124). 
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a list of “high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions.” In relation to the non-cooperative 
jurisdictions, it warned: 
“The FATF is not yet satisfied that the following jurisdictions have made sufficient 
progress on their action plan agreed upon with the FATF. The most significant action plan 
items or the majority of their action plan items have not been addressed. If these 
jurisdictions do not take sufficient action to implement significant components of their 
action plan by June 2011, then the FATF will identify these jurisdictions as being out of 
compliance with their agreed action plans and will take the additional step of calling upon 
its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with the 
jurisdiction.”56 
For Saul, the FATF has a powerful influence on the conduct of all states, because the 
consequences of non-compliance and exclusion are costly, given that the FATF comprises the 
most powerful economies in the world. Providing member states with technical assistance makes 
compliance easier to achieve even when capacity is lacking. The FATF works not only with states, 
but also with financial institutions in enhancing its influence on the practices of financial 
institutions around the world.57  
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2.5        Observer Members of the FATF 
2.5.1  The World Bank 
The World Bank is not a standard setter in AML law; rather, its main role is to help countries in 
meeting the standards set by the FATF Recommendations. Specifically, the World Bank helps to 
prevent and to suppress ML by providing technical assistance on risk management. It assists in 
building stronger legal, institutional and governance frameworks. It encourages countries to 
undertake legislative and institutional reforms, to adopt changes in mind-sets and institutional 
culture, and to strive for better governance. The World Bank also encourages close cooperation 
among state institutions, and exhorts countries to establish AML networks with one another in 
the sphere of law enforcement, FIUs and financial supervision.58  
2.5.2  The IMF 
The IMF’s efforts to combat ML have helped to shape domestic and international AML policies. 
It conducts financial sector assessments and enhances personnel capacity in countries by way of 
providing financial integrity advice. Furthermore, it evaluates how countries comply with 
international AML standards and develops programmes to help them address identified 
shortcomings. In line with a growing recognition and importance which the IMF attaches to issues 
related to financial integrity, it has created several AML programmes over the years. In 2004, the 
Executive Board of the IMF agreed to make AML assessments and capacity development 
activities a regular part of the IMF’s work. The IMF addresses financial integrity issues in specific 
                                                          
58 Republic of Serbia World Bank & the fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. Available 
 at http://www.apml.gov.rs/eng200/saradnja/World-Bank.html  (last visited on 22 September 2018). 
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circumstances. It provides a framework to deal with cases where ML and related serious crimes 
threaten domestic stability, balance of payments stability, the effective operation of the 
international monetary system and the stability of the domestic financial system.59 
2.5.3  The Wolfsberg Group 
The Wolfsberg Group is an association of thirteen global banks.60 The Group is named after 
Château Wolfsberg where the banks held their first meetings and where they continue to hold 
their annual forum. Having started out to address ML risks in private banking, the Wolfsberg 
Group has since developed a broad range of standards and diverse programmes of activities. 
These address not only its original focus on AML, but also other financial crime risks within the 
financial industry, such as corruption, terrorist financing and sanctions.61  
The Wolfsberg Group was the first body to recommend to the banking industry ways of improving 
its ability to combat the financing of terrorism, highlighting areas where banks could do better 
and where there was room for better cooperation with the public sector. The Wolfsberg Group 
has neither a written constitution nor any formalised set of rules or statutes. It has developed its 
                                                          
59 International Monetary Fund Factsheet The IMF and the fight against Money Laundering and the Financing 
 of Terrorism at 2-3. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/aml.pdf  
 (last visited on 22 September 2018). 
60 The members of the Wolfsberg Group are Banco Santander, Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo- Mitsubishi 
 UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Société 
 Générale, Standard Chartered Bank and UBS. Available at https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com 
 (last visited on 22 September 2018). 
61 Aiolfi G & Bauer The Wolfsberg Group at 2. Available at  
 https://www.wolfsbergprinciples.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/The-Wolfsberg-Group.pdf  
(last visited on 22 September 2018). 
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practices and procedures over the course of its existence although it has not put in place 
monitoring mechanisms or sanctions for omissions by its members.62 
2.6  The Egmont Group of FIUs 
In 1995, a group of national FIUs came together at the Egmont Arenberg Palace in Brussels, 
Belgium, to establish the Egmont Group, which is an informal network of FIUs created with the 
common goal of increasing inter-FIU cooperation. The Egmont Group has since evolved into a 
network of 139 member FIUs from around the world, and is recognised for its work by the FATF.63 
The network consists of the Heads of FIUs, the Egmont Committee, the Egmont Group 
Secretariat, Regional Groups and Working Groups. The Egmont Committee is composed of all 
member FIUs and appoints the governing Head of FIU for a two-year term.64 
The most important document issued by the group is the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence 
Units Principles for Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units, which was 
adopted by the heads of FIUs in July 2013. These principles are binding on all members and in 
case a member does not comply, it will be subject to the “Egmont Group Support and Compliance 
Process.” Under the Principles for Information Exchange, member FIUs are expected to 
cooperate and share information based on mutual trust and reciprocity. 65 The Egmont principles 
encourage international cooperation between FIUs in ML cases, based on trust and flexibility. 
                                                          
62   Aiolfi G & Bauer HP at 5. 
63 Petruzzi R & Spies K Tax Policy Challenges in the 21st Century (2014) at 268, Series of International Tax Law   
      Volume 86 LLM Vienna. 
64 Petruzzi R & Spies K (2014: 268). 
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They emphasise that FIUs should be able to provide one another with financial intelligence upon 
request or spontaneously.66 
Further, it is taken that any member FIU of the Egmont Group will co-operate with other FIUs 
across national borders. Equally, membership of the Egmont Group encourages FIUs to be 
vigilant, hence assisting in the global fight against ML.67  
Information exchanged by FIUs may be used only for the specific purpose for which the 
information was requested or provided. It may not be transferred to another authority, including 
for use as evidence in a court case, without the prior consent of the disclosing FIU. In addition, 
the confidentiality of the information provided is to be protected by strict controls and 
safeguards. At the minimum, the information shared with another FIU is protected by the same 
confidentiality provisions that apply to similar information received from domestic sources by 
the receiving FIU.68  
2.7  The ESAAMLG and its Relationship to the Malawian FIA 
ESAAMLG was established in 1999 as an FATF-style Regional Body (hereafter FSRB). It consists of 
14 countries. It monitors the implementation of AML international standards in its member 
countries through self-assessment exercises and mutual evaluation. ESAAMLG also conducts 
                                                          
66  Egmont Group Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Charter (2013) at 4, approved by the Egmont 
 Heads of Financial Intelligence Units.  
 Available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/1%20Charter%20-%20Nov%2028%202013%20(1).pdf   
 (last visited on 6 August 2018). 
67 Egmont Group (2013: 6). 
68 World Bank (2004: 69).  
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technical analysis and publishes reports of ML and typologies.69 One such typology concerned 
money laundering through the real estate sector. 
ESSAMLG published its first mutual evaluation report on Malawi in 2008. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Malawi has tried to meet most of the recommendations made in the ESAAMLG 
report by enacting the 2017 FCA.  
2.8  International Legal Instruments Regulating International Anti-Money Laundering Law 
The Palermo Convention is the first binding international instrument that deals with organised 
crime in a comprehensive manner.70  Article 1 states that the aim of the Convention is to promote 
cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more effectively. Additionally, 
the Convention contains what has become the internationally accepted definition of the offence 
of ML, although the term ‘money laundering’ does not appear anywhere in the text.71  
Furthermore, article 6(1)(a) of the Palermo Convention provides that each State Party shall 
adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish criminal offences. 
Article 7 of the Palermo Convention requires each State Party to institute a comprehensive 
domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, 
where appropriate, other bodies susceptible to ML, within its competence, to deter and detect 
all forms of ML.  
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 States Parties are to ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other 
authorities dedicated to combating ML (including, where appropriate under domestic law, 
judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information. This could be done 
at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by the State’s domestic 
law. The Convention encourages States to consider the establishment of an FIU to serve as a 
national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential 
ML.72 
States Parties are required to implement workable measures to detect and monitor the 
movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to 
safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement 
of legitimate capital.73 In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the 
terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of the Convention, States Parties 
are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and 
multilateral organisations against ML.74 
Another important Convention is the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (also known as the Vienna Convention). Article 3(1)(b)(I) of 
Vienna Convention criminalises the conversion or transfer of property, with knowledge that such 
property is derived from any offence or offences established under the Convention, or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
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illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such 
an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions.75 
The Vienna Convention also criminalises the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, 
location, disposition, movement, rights, regarding ownership of property, with knowledge that 
such property is derived from an offence or offences established under the Convention or from 
an act of participation in such an offence or offences.76  
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (hereafter UNODC) coordinates the main efforts of the UN 
regarding ML control and prevention. The UNODC implements the Global Program against ML, 
which is a research and technical cooperation initiative that aims to increase the effectiveness of 
international efforts against ML.77  
2.9  Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the international legal framework that regulates FIUs and AML law. 
Whilst AML law is not governed by any formal Convention, the FATF Recommendations are soft 
law regulating ML and enforced through a self-assessment and mutual evaluation process. 
Despite their formally non-binding nature, any country that ignores the Recommendations could 
be subjected to economic reprisals as a result of the FATF’s placing it on the list of non-
cooperative jurisdictions. The economic reprisals express themselves in the form of a lack of 
direct foreign investment, a state of affairs that works to the particular detriment of developing 
countries. This chapter also discussed the crucial role of FIUs in combating ML in pursuance of 
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FATF Recommendation 29. The chapter looked also at the importance of FATF Regional Bodies in 
fighting ML. The next chapter takes stock of Malawi’s FCA. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MALAWI’S FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY   
3.1  Introduction   
As already stated in Chapter One, AML in Malawi is regulated by the FIA, which is an institution 
established under the FCA. Section 3(1) of the FCA establishes an independent and autonomous 
FIA whose aim, as stated in the preamble, is to improve the prevention, investigation and the 
combating of financial and related or consequential crimes; to enable the tracing, identification, 
tracking, freezing, seizure or confiscation of proceeds of crimes; and to provide for connected 
and incidental matters.  
This chapter discusses the legal and institutional framework under which Malawi’s FIA operates. 
It compares the laws regulating the South African and Namibian Financial Intelligence Centres. 
However, the chapter will concentrate on Malawi. 
3.2  Institutional set up of Malawi’s FIA 
3.2.1 The Powers of the FIA  
The FIA is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with the power to 
enter into contracts, and is capable of suing and being sued in its own name.78 In performing its 
functions, the FIA is not to be subject to the direction, control or influence of any other person, 
authority or entity which may compromise its operational independence.79  
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The FIA has the authority to issue directives, guidelines or rules to reporting institutions as it may 
consider necessary for the better carrying out of its functions.80 It also has the authority to impose 
and enforce administrative sanctions and penalties against a party in breach of the FCA.81 In 
addition, the FIA has powers to investigate any matter related to implementing the FCA.82 The 
FIA may compel the production of or access to any record, document or information and may 
make notes and take copies of the whole or any part of the record, document or information.83 
Where appropriate, in consultation with a supervisory authority or self-regulatory body, the FIA 
may issue instructions, directions, guidelines or rules to a supervisory authority or self-regulatory 
body as it may consider necessary for the better carrying out of its functions. The FIA may also 
delegate its powers to a supervisory authority or self-regulatory body to issue instructions, 
directions, guidelines or rules regarding the application of the Act, provided that a supervisory 
authority or self-regulatory body consults the FIA before issuing any instructions, directions, 
guidelines or rules.84 
The FIA may access the widest range of financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information from any supervisory authority, financial regulatory authority, fiscal or tax agency, 
competent authority or fraud investigations agency. The authority may also request and receive 
information from any person, institution or agency, whether local or international, in the 
discharge of its functions. It may request and receive progress and outcome reports from law 
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enforcement or prosecutorial agents on matters referred to them. The FIA also has the authority 
to instruct a reporting institution to take such steps as may be appropriate to facilitate any 
anticipated investigations and the power to enter any agreements or arrangements with any local 
institution or agency regarding the exchange of information.85 
3.2.1.1   Overall Analysis of the Powers of the FIA  
As discerned from the above-stated provisions of the FCA, the provisions do not confer 
prosecutorial powers upon the FIA. The FIA is entrusted with wider powers to investigate and 
disseminate financial intelligence. This paper argues that, for the fight against ML to show results 
in Malawi, a hybrid type of FIA is required, vested with the powers to investigate and prosecute 
cases of ML.  
As mentioned above, the FIA’s role is to disseminate financial intelligence to help in the 
prosecution of financial crimes such as ML. Similar powers are conferred upon other state law 
enforcement institutions such as the ACB, the MPS and the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
Looking at the offence of ML, its complexity requires special technical expertise for it to be 
effectively investigated and prosecuted. 
In Malawi, most ML offences are committed by public officials involved in corruption. For over 
three years now, Malawi has been in the throes of a corruption scandal unprecedented in its 
scope and scale. The Cashgate scandal, which involved huge sums of money discovered in the 
homes and cars of civil servants and business people, implicated scores of senior public officials, 
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many of whom have been convicted for systematically embezzling huge amounts of government 
funds.86 
A string of investigations and criminal trials were launched, and 13 civil servants and business 
people have so far been found guilty of theft and ML. They are serving jail sentences ranging 
between three and eleven years of imprisonment with hard labour. However, some main players 
have yet to be convicted.87 
Since 2014, Malawi’s public prosecutors and the ACB have achieved more than a dozen 
convictions. But this is just a fraction of the hundreds of people under investigation. Meanwhile, 
some trials, including the one against Paul Mphwiyo88 and his 17 co-accused, have been dragging 
on for years, with frequent adjournments.89 
Progress in disposing of the cases is hamstrung by Malawi’s limited experience in dealing with 
ML cases and criminal trials involving grand corruption. For judges and lawyers alike, this is 
uncharted territory and they have proceeded only haltingly. The frequent frictions between the 
MPS, the ACB, and the Director of Public Prosecutions have also not helped to speed up the 
disposal of cases. From the beginning, the relationship between the three agencies has been 
characterised by rivalry, mistrust and miscommunication.90  
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It is submitted that the role of Malawi’s FIA should not end at the investigation stage, but should 
include the prosecution of ML cases. The fact of the matter is that Malawi’s FIA is the most 
competent institution to be vested with the authority to prosecute cases of ML. This is because 
lawyers working in the FIA are more experienced in handling economic crimes like ML than 
ordinary public prosecutors, who have little or no expertise in this field. The risk is that, if the 
prosecutors lack the knowledge and expertise, they will struggle to secure a conviction on the 
ML charges. 
3.2.2 The Core Functions of Malawi’s FIA 
Financial intelligence services are vital to the survival of nations. Effective financial intelligence 
services help nations anticipate and prevent attacks, thereby protecting themselves from forces 
detrimental to the security and stability of the country.91 
Section 4 of the FCA provides for the functions of the FIA. More particularly, section 4(d) provides 
that the functions of the FIA, among others, are to conduct research into trends, techniques and 
developments in financial crimes, including ML, tracing proceeds of crime and terrorist financing, 
in order to improve the detection, prevention and deterrence of ML and terrorist financing. The 
FIA is also mandated to cooperate with local and international institutions, organisations or 
agencies in realising its objects. It may also advise and apprise the Minister of Finance on trends, 
patterns and developments emerging in relation to what the Act seeks to combat. The FIA may 
offer training and support on any matter, conduct public awareness on matters relating to the 
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offences pursuant to the objectives of and in compliance with the Act. The FIA may also design, 
develop and implement internal systems, controls, policies and procedures regarding security of 
its personnel, documents and information, including procedures for handling, storage, 
dissemination, and protection of and access to information.92 
3.2.3 Other Functions of Malawi’s FIA 
Although all FIUs affiliated to the Egmont Group have the three core functions of receiving, 
analysing and disseminating information on STRs, some FIUs are also entrusted with other 
functions.93 This is particularly true for the Malawian FIA which is entrusted with such other 
functions under the FCA.   
Malawi’s FIA is vested with supervisory authority over financial institutions by ensuring that all 
reporting institutions comply with the FCA.94 The FIA is entrusted with the authority to monitor 
the compliance of financial institutions to ensure that they adhere to international AML 
standards.95 
The supervisors and regulators working under Malawi’s FIA have an extensive knowledge of the 
sectors concerned. They can integrate the ML risk in their general risk analysis, and are 
experienced supervisors. Moreover, they are often well-resourced. 96 
                                                          
92 Section 4(e)-(I) of the FCA. 
93 International Monetary Fund, World Bank Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (2004) 70, 
 Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund, Legal Dept., Monetary and Financial Systems Department. 
 Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf (last visited on 23 July 2017). 
94  Section 35(1) of the FCA. 
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Furthermore, whenever the FIA has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds in a particular 
customer’s account at any reporting institution may be proceeds of an offence, the FIA may direct 
the reporting institution within one working day, not to proceed with the carrying out of the 
suspicious transaction.  Where appropriate, the FIA may freeze any funds or reverse any 
transaction in respect of the funds affected by suspected proceeds of an offence for a period not 
exceeding 90 working days. This timeframe affords the authority an opportunity to make 
necessary inquiries concerning the transaction; and, if deemed appropriate, to inform and advise 
the appropriate competent authority.97 
3.2.4 Funding of the FIA 
Malawi’s FIA derives its funds through the money appropriated annually by the National 
Assembly. Other funds include the penalties the authority may impose for breach of the FCA; 
fees charged by the authority; grants, gifts and donations made to the authority with prior 
approval of the Minister.98 The FIA is required to prepare an annual budget of revenue and 
expenditure which is submitted to the Minister at least three months prior to the 
commencement of the financial year.99 
3.2.5 The Recruitment Process of the Director General of the FIA 
The FIA is headed by a Director General who is appointed by the President for a five-year term, 
renewable once, upon terms and conditions specified in the instrument of appointment.100 The 
Director General is the chief executive officer of the FIA and is also a public officer, whose 
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appointment is subject to confirmation by the Public Appointments Committee (hereafter PAC) 
of the National Assembly.101 
In case of a vacancy in the office of the Director General, the Minister is required to advertise the 
position in the Gazette and at least two newspapers of widest circulation in Malawi, and to 
shortlist and interview the candidates.  A minimum of two and a maximum of three candidates 
are selected for the position. The Minister sends the list of shortlisted candidates to the President 
for the appointment of one of them as Director General. The shortlisted candidates go through 
security clearance and vetting procedures. The President, subject to a confirmation by the PAC 
of the National Assembly, appoints the Director General only from the names on the list 
recommended by the Minister. If the President rejects all the names put forward, he must send 
the list back to the Minister, stating the reasons for his refusal of the nominated names. Where 
the President rejects all the nominated names for the appointment of a Director General, the 
position is advertised again, which entails another round of interviews.102 
A person appointed as Director General may not hold any position as a parliamentary deputy, 
cabinet minister, or serve as a member of the judiciary, neither may such a person hold any office 
in a political party or its affiliate.103 A person whom a court has removed on account of 
misconduct in the exercise of his duties is not eligible to be appointed or remain Director General 
of the FIA.104  It is further required that the Director General be a person of integrity with 
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recognised, relevant qualifications, and experience in matters of finance, law or law 
enforcement.105  
3.2.5.1   Overall Analysis of the Recruitment Process of the Director General of the FIA 
The recruitment process of the Director General of the FIA indicates that the FIA is not 
independent of the government. The President has too much power over the appointment of the 
Director. For example, one wonders why the President should appoint a person from a list of 
nominated candidates over whose interviews he did not preside. If the President rejects the 
names put forward, then this would reflect his mistrust of the interviewing committee. Here, 
there is a high probability that the President would exercise his powers arbitrarily. He is likely to 
appoint someone who is politically loyal to him. This paper argues that section 7 of the FCA, which 
empowers the President to choose a Director of the FIA from a list of nominees, be repealed as 
the provision is open to potential abuse.  
Can someone appointed at the pleasure of the President exercise his powers to the detriment of 
the appointing instance, in this case the President? The legal arrangement regulating the 
appointment does not rule out that such pandering can occur. A counter-argument would be that 
the President’s decision is subject to the approval of Parliament. The problem, though, is that 
Malawi’s Parliament consists mostly of members of the same political party as the President.  
Of the 193 members of Parliament, 50 belong to the President’s Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), 48 to the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), 26 to the Peoples Party (PP), 14 to the United 
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Democratic Front (UDF), and one to each of the Alliance for Democracy and the Chipani Cha fuko 
(CCP). There is one vacant seat and there are 52 independent members of parliament.106 Besides 
the 50 elected members of the DPP, some independent, PP, CCP and the UDF parliamentarians 
joined the government side of the National Assembly. Practically, these parliamentarians would 
not frustrate the interests of the President to whom they owe allegiance. This means that, even 
if the parliamentary opposition votes against the President’s appointment, this would not have 
any practical effects as the majority would have voted in support of the President’s appointment. 
This is because the President’s DPP has many parliamentarians on its side, meaning that the 
opposition parliamentarians are automatically outnumbered.107    
It is against the above background that this study argues that the whole process under which the 
Director General of the FIA is appointed in Malawi infringes upon the independence and 
autonomy of the institution. This violates Recommendation 29 of the FATF, which requires that 
the FIU should be operationally independent and autonomous. Independence guarantees that 
an FIU has the power to work freely and to make autonomous decisions based on STRs it receives. 
Recommendation 29 of the FATF furthermore requires that an FIU must decide for itself to whom 
it disseminates financial intelligence. Any interference in these functions from outside would 
compromise its functional independence.108  
                                                          
106 Eisa: African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project “Malawi 2014 National Assembly seat distribution by party 
 and gender.” Available at https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/mal2014results2.htm  
(last visited on 3 August 2018). 
107 Reference is again made to Section 48(3) of the 1994 Republic of Malawi Constitution. 
108 The Financial Action Task Force International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the  
        Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (2016), 99 available at   
        http://www.fatf-  gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf  
        (last visited on 3 August 2018).   
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In Malawi, the offence of ML is commonly perpetrated by public officials and politically exposed 
persons. In most cases, the public officials and the politically exposed persons are allies of the 
President in practice. Invariably, in a case involving the President’s ally, it is highly probable that 
the Malawian FIA would be reluctant to follow up an investigation if this would harm the 
President’s public image. 
3.2.6  The Recruitment Process of the Deputy Director General and other Staff of the FIA 
The Minister, in consultation with the Director General, is vested with the authority to appoint 
the Deputy Director. A person appointed to this position must have integrity and must have the 
relevant qualifications and experience in matters of finance, law, or law enforcement. The 
Director General appoints the candidate for the position of the Deputy Director and determines 
the conditions of employment, including the salary of the appointee, subject to ministerial 
approval.109 
The procedure governing the appointment of the Deputy Director of Malawi’s FIA under section 
9 of the FCA requires the Minister to make such an appointment in consultation with the Director 
General. Again, this executive appointment is open to criticism, given that in Malawi, where 
Ministers are appointed by the President,110 there is no way the Minister would by himself or 
herself make an appointment of the Deputy Director of Malawi’s FIA without consulting the 
President. This process too undermines the independence of the FIA in the eyes of the public. 
                                                          
109 Section 9(1)-(2) of the FCA. 
110 Section 92(1) of the 1994 Republic of Malawi Constitution provides that there shall be a Cabinet           
       consisting of the President, the First Vice-President, the Second Vice-President and such Ministers and 
 Deputy Ministers as may from time to time be appointed by the President.  
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Regarding other staff members, the FCA requires that the new appointees to the FIA undergo 
security clearance, vetting procedures and understanding of their responsibilities in handling and 
disseminating sensitive and confidential information. The personnel are public servants.111 The 
Director General or the Deputy Director General or any employee of the FIA or any person acting 
under the direction of the FIA is immune from action for anything done in good faith in the 
administration or discharge of any powers, duties or functions under the FCA.112  
3.3  Malawi’s Experience where the FIA was arguably seen to be compromised 
3.3.1 Allegation of Fraudulent Transactions in Ration Packs Contracts between Malawi Police 
Service (MPS) and Pioneer Investments 
The ACB investigated a Malawi police food supply contract that was awarded to a firm called 
Pioneer Investments, owned by businessman Zameer Karim. The political standoff began after a 
report by the ACB leaked onto the internet around June 2018.113 Malawi's President Peter 
Mutharika was under pressure to resign after the leaked report accused him of receiving a 
kickback from the MK2.8 billion (about $3.9 million) contract to supply food to the MPS.114   
The report alleges that the head of finance of MPS, Innocent Bottomani, and Mr Karim had 
connived to award Pioneer Investments a contract to provide 500,000 food ration packs. Days 
                                                          
111 Section 9(3)-(5) of the FCA. 
112 Section 11 of the FCA. 
113 Anti-Corruption Bureau Investigations Report Allegation of fraudulent transactions in Ration Packs 
 contract between Malawi Police Service and Pioneer Investments (Ref No: CR/LL/200/2017). Available at 
 https://malawi24.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Malawi-Police-Peter-Mutharika-Corruption-ACB.pdf  
 (last visited on 1 October 2018). 
114 Malawi’s President Muntharika and the Police Food Scandal (4 July 2018) British Broadcasting 
 Corporation News. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44714224 
(last visited on 1 October 2018). 
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after the contract was signed, Pioneer Investments allegedly asked for a change to the agreed 
price from MK2.3 billion to nearly MK2.8 billion. The report states that the head of finance of 
MPS fraudulently approved the change.115  
When Mr Karim of Pioneer Investments was paid for supplying the food ration packs in 2016, he 
allegedly deposited MK145 million (about $200,000) into the DPP’s Standard Bank Account 
Number 014003192200 which is reportedly managed by President Mutharika as he is the sole 
signatory of that account. 116 
Relevant to note for purposes of ML and the FIA is that the President withdrew and used MK65 
million of the MK145 million to purchase an office building for his political party.117 As civil society 
organisations and members of the general public intensified their attacks on the President for 
receiving the proceeds of Karim’s corrupt conduct, President Muntharika’s Democratic 
Progressive Party announced that it was returning to Karim the MK145 million it received. 
Immediately after the money was returned to Mr Karim’s account, the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
announced that the FIA had frozen the account to prevent Karim from tampering with the funds 
until further legal determinations of the matter.118 
                                                          
115 Malawi ACB Investigations Report (Ref No: CR/LL/200/2017: 4). 
116 Malawi ACB Investigations Report (Ref No: CR/LL/200/2017: 6). 
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The question is why the Malawian FIA froze only the returned MK145 million. Ideally, if the FIA 
was autonomous, as required by the FATF Recommendations, it was equally duty bound to seize 
the office building which the President bought using the alleged proceeds of corruption. The role 
of the FIA in this matter is questionable. The FIA’s failure to act shows that the institution is 
compromised when dealing with ML, depending on who is involved. This case clearly shows that 
Malawi’s FIA is only theoretically but not practically independent, for in theory  section 93(1) of 
the Malawian FCA mandates the FIA to seize any property that it believes, on reasonable grounds, 
to be tainted property.  
From the outset, the office building which was purchased from the proceeds of corruption brings 
into focus the offence of ML. The purchase of the office building may have been for purposes of 
concealing or rather disguising the illegal nature of the funds obtained. This paper therefore 
submits that the DPP’s office building purchased from the proceeds of alleged corruption, is 
property that the Malawian FIA was required to seize in the execution of its duties under the FCA. 
Furthermore, the ACB’s leaked investigation report recommended that Karim of Pioneer 
Investments and Bottomani of MPS be charged and prosecuted for ML and other criminal 
offences. The ACB, however, could not recommend prosecuting President Muntharika for any of 
the criminal offences since section 91(2) of the 1994 Republic of Malawi Constitution grants him 
immunity as a sitting head of State.119  Contrary to the investigation report that implicated the 
President and others, the ACB Director General, Rayneck Matemba, recently announced that the 
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President was cleared of any criminal charges as he did not personally benefit from the MK145 
million. 120   
Karim and Bottomani have alleged connections with Muntharika’s government. But no law 
enforcement agency has yet arrested or charged the two suspects, neither has any trial against 
them begun. This remains the case despite the ACB’s report that investigations on the matter are 
concluded. It is therefore submitted that, just as the FIA appears to be compromised due to 
political interference, the ACB may also be compromised and hamstrung in its AML efforts. This 
raises serious concerns about whether Malawi’s FIA and other law enforcement institutions are 
up to the task of fighting ML.  
3.3.2 Malawi’s Cashgate Scandal 
"Cashgate" is a financial scandal involving the looting, theft and corruption that happened 
at Capital Hill, the seat of the Government of Malawi. The scandal was uncovered during the 
Presidency of Joyce Banda, although it is believed to have begun before her taking office.121 
Cashgate first came to light when an assistant accountant in the Ministry of Environment was 
found with several thousand US dollars in his car. A week later, the Budget Director in the 
Ministry of Finance was shot outside his house. Several other civil servants were found hiding 
huge sums of money, thus unravelling what came to be known as the “Cashgate” scandal.122 
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Following the Cashgate revelation, the British government sponsored an independent audit 
focusing on transactions made through the Malawi government’s electronic financial 
management system. The audit found that an estimated $32 million were stolen during the six-
month period under review. In October 2013, more than 70 people were arrested in connection 
with Cashgate, many of whom were subsequently tried and convicted.123 
In October 2014, Baker Tilly, a public accounting and consulting firm headquartered in Chicago, 
provided the Malawi government with a report summarising individual case files from its original 
audit of Malawi’s Cashgate. The report named the individuals and companies involved in the illicit 
Cashgate-related transactions.124  
The report further drew a sample of 501 suspicious transactions believed to have occurred 
between April and September 2013. The auditors found that around MK6.1 billion (about 
$14.5m) were paid out to 16 companies for services that had not been supplied. Payments with 
no further documents accounted for a further MK4 billion. It was also reported that the supply 
of government contracts had been inflated by MK3.6 billion.125 
Baker Tilly’s audit report also revealed that Malawi’s financial banks suffered from a “significant 
control failure”. Particularly, Standard Bank Malawi is reported to have processed MK3.8 billion 
of the Cashgate payments, a much larger sum than any other institution. For instance, auditors 
                                                          
123 Anders G (2017: 3). 
124 Tilly B Cashgate: A Summary Report on the Findings arising from work carried out into Fraud and  
      Mismanagement of Malawi Government Finances (September 2014) National Audit Office of Malawi.  
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pointed out that a MK150 million withdrawal was made on a single day from Standard Bank’s 
Balaka District Branch. As Balaka District is a regional operation with low commercial activity, 
the scale of such a transaction would have been unusual. Internal mechanisms such as paywalls 
and passwords were overturned, probably because of management overrides. It is argued that 
the withdrawal of huge sums of cash, should have raised suspicions among bank staff. The banks, 
however, sparingly reported suspicious transactions to the FIU. 126  
This paper does not intend to discuss the individual Cashgate cases. Rather, the intention is to 
look at the role that the FIA could have played to ensure that Cashgate was prevented.  Malawi’s 
AML law requires financial institutions to report certain monetary and any suspicious 
transactions to the FIU. An intentional reporting violation by an officer of a financial institution 
was punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment, and for the institution a fine and loss of 
business authority under Malawi’s AML repealed law. Although, at most, only 50 STRs were 
annually sent to the FIU, no bank was ever investigated for failure to generate such reports. In 
fact, the AML law was never used to prosecute anyone.127 
Malawi’s Ministry of Tourism’s Chief Officer, Leonard Kalonga, who has already been convicted 
of Cashgate-related offences claimed that the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi instructed 
managers at commercial banks to cash all government cheques without question. Whether that 
was true or not, it appears the banks violated the rules by turning a blind eye and not raising any 
                                                          
126 Mail Guardian Malawi theft balloons to R540 million. Available at  
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concerns at the large sums deposited and withdrawn. It is alleged that on the rare occasions that 
banks generated STRs, the Monitoring and Analysis Manager of Malawi’s FIU suppressed the 
reports.128 
The Malawi ACB investigator also alleged that the FIU was a beneficiary of Cashgate as it received 
MK100 million (about $134,000) to pervert the course of justice.129 The ACB investigator argued 
that Malawi’s Accountant General and the FIU were tasked with ensuring that organised theft 
went through the system undetected.130 The investigator gave this testimony whilst testifying in 
the MK2.4 billion Cashgate case involving the former budget director, Paul Mphwiyo, and others. 
Malawi’s FIA, an institution responsible for detecting and preventing ML was in this regard found 
to be in a compromised situation in dealing with Cashgate cases.131  
This paper argues that the FIA’s alleged involvement in Cashgate compromised its mandate to 
combat ML. Had the FIA been serious about preventing ML, there would not have been such 
huge sums of money withdrawn from government accounts through commercial banks without 
detection.  Top government officials influenced the FIA not to react to suspicious transactions. 
Surely, the FIA was compromised and could not effectively handle the Cashgate scandal, 
considering that the FIA’s top employees were involved in manipulating the system. 
                                                          
128 Strasser PG & McCall C (2016: 329). 
129 Chilunga Z ACB Investigator testifies in court on Cashgate beneficiaries (16 May 2018) Nyasa Times: 
 Malawi Breaking Online News Source. Available at https://www.nyasatimes.com/acb-investigator-testifies-
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3.4  Comparative Law Perspectives 
South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre (hereafter SAFIC) derives its mandate to combat ML 
from the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 1 of 2017. Similarly, Namibia’s Financial Intelligence 
Centre (hereafter NFIC) derives its mandate to combat ML from the Financial Intelligence Act 13 
of 2012.   
3.4.1 An Overall Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Framework of SAFIC compared to 
Malawi’s FIA 
The SAFIC is an institution outside the public service but within the public administration.132 
Similar to the objectives of Malawi’s FIA, the SAFIC’s principal objectives are to assist in the 
identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities as well as to combat ML activities and the 
financing of terrorist and other related activities. In addition, it is required to implement financial 
sanctions pursuant to Resolutions adopted by the UNSC, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.133  
Other objectives of the SAFIC include making information collected by it available to the 
commercial police, the prosecuting authorities, the intelligence agencies, the South African 
Revenue Service, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, the Intelligence Division of 
the National Defence Force, and the Office of the Public Protector an investigative division in an 
organ of State, or a supervisory body.134 
The SAFIC is furthermore required to administer measures requiring accountable institutions to 
freeze property and transactions pursuant to financial sanctions that may arise from Resolutions 
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adopted by the UNSC.135 The SAFIC may exchange intelligence with AML bodies in other 
countries.136 
The SAFIC is headed by a Director who is appointed by the Minister of Finance. A person 
appointed as the Director holds office in the SAFIC for a term not exceeding five years, which is 
renewable. The terms and conditions of employment are set out in a written employment 
contract. They include conditions governing measurable performance standards.137 
No person may be appointed as the Director of the SAFIC unless the information regarding that 
person has been gathered in a vetting investigation by the State Security Agency. After evaluating 
the gathered information, and if satisfied that such a person has little possibility of being a 
security risk, the Minister may proceed to appoint such person as a Director.138  
If the Minister is satisfied, a certificate is issued certifying that such person has successfully 
undergone a security clearance.139 The Minister may withdraw the certificate if he or she obtains 
information from an investigation which, after evaluation, causes the Minister to believe that the 
Director could be a security risk or could possibly act in any manner prejudicial to the objectives 
or functions of the SAFIC.140 Once the certificate is withdrawn, the Director may not perform any 
functions of the Centre and the Minister is required to discharge him or her from the position.141 
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Funding of the SAFIC is obtained through the moneys appropriated annually to it by Parliament, 
any government grants made to it, as well as any other money legally acquired by it through 
donations, but only with the approval of the Minister.142 As is the case with Malawi’s FIA, there 
is an executive power which is indirectly derived from its Director General being appointed by 
the Minister who is appointed by the President.143 In reality, the President is the final arbiter as 
to who is appointed as it is hardly conceivable that the Minister can act without the imprimatur 
of the President. Similarly, political influence over the SAFIC makes it vulnerable to political 
interference, just as is the case with Malawi’s FIA. 
However, unlike Malawi, that has placed the primary responsibility of investigating cases of ML 
on the FIA, the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (hereafter DPCI) has the primary 
responsibility for investigating ML cases in South Africa. The DPCI’s mandate includes the 
investigation of organised crime, serious commercial crime (including ML), crime against the 
state (including terrorism), serious corruption, and other serious crimes selected by the head of 
DPCI or referred by the Commissioner of South African Police Service.144  
It bears noting also that the IMF has found that the SAFIC has been operating effectively by 
providing support to the investigatory and prosecutorial efforts to combat ML. Apart from the 
SAFIC, South Africa has also strengthened its law enforcement efforts within the South African 
                                                          
142 Section 14(1)(a)-(c) of the SAFICA. 
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Police Service to investigate ML offences.145 Arguably, this would mean that the SAFIC is an 
administrative type of FIU as its duty is to disseminate financial Intelligence to investigative and 
prosecutorial bodies like the DPCI. This arrangement seems to have worked well for South Africa 
as the country has a specialised department dealing with AML activities. In contrast, an 
administrative type of FIU may not yield AML successes in Malawi given that there is no other 
specialised AML department apart from the FIA. Hence, a hybrid type of FIU which is authorised 
to investigate and prosecute might be better suited to Malawi, which has no other specialised 
AML department outside the FIA.  
3.4.2 Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Framework of NFIC 
The NFIC is responsible for combating ML in Namibia. It executes its duties in collaboration with 
the other LEAs.146 It is empowered to collect, request, receive, process, analyse and assess all 
reports, requests for information and information received from persons, accountable 
institutions, reporting institutions, government offices, ministries, agencies or any other 
competent authorities and any foreign agencies.147  The NFIC is also mandated to collect statistics 
and records of STRs and requests from appropriate authorities for information received and 
intelligence disseminated.148 The NFIC is further tasked with the duty of coordinating the 
activities of the various persons, bodies or institutions involved in combating  ML.149 It  is required 
                                                          
145 International Monetary Fund (2015: 8). 
146 Section 8 of FICA 13 of 2012. 
147 Section 9(1)(a) of NFICA. 
148 Section 9(1)(e)(i)-(ii) of NFICA. 
149 Section 9(1)(f) of NFICA. 
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to conduct research into trends and developments in ML and to improve the detection, 
prevention and deterrence of ML.150 
The NFIC is led by the Director who is appointed by the Minister of Finance after consultation 
with the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Council. 151 The 
incumbent holds office for five years which may be subject to renewal.152 The Director is, among 
others, responsible for the dissemination of intelligence involving suspected proceeds of crime, 
ML, terrorist property or financing of terrorism, to competent authorities and foreign agencies 
with powers and duties similar to that of the Centre.153 The Director may, with the approval of 
the Governor of the Bank of Namibia, appoint the Centre’s personnel.154 
As in Malawi and South Africa, the NFIC utilises the funds appropriated to it annually by 
Parliament. The NFIC may also utilise any government grants or money made available to it and 
any other money legally acquired by the Centre.155 The NFIC may also, with the approval of the 
Minister, accept financial donations or contributions from any other source.156 
In essence, NFIC’s mandate is similar to that of its counterparts. However, the manner of 
appointing the Director of the NFICA is unique as the Director of NFIC is appointed by the Minister 
of Finance after consultation with the AML Council. The involvement of the AML Council suggests 
that there is an independent non-political body overseeing the appointment of the Director. The 
                                                          
150 Section 9(2)(f) of NFICA. 
151 Section 11(1) of NFICA. 
152 Section 11(2)(a) of NFICA.  
153 Section 12(1)(f) of NFICA.  
154 Section 13(1) of NFICA.  
155 Section 14(1)(a)-(d) of NFICA.  
156 Section 14(2) of NFICA. 
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procedure affords an independent body the opportunity to review the Finance Minister’s 
appointment of the Director. 
Despite the involvement of an independent body in the appointment process, it cannot be said 
that the Director of the NFIC is wholly free of political or executive interference in the execution 
of his or her duties. As in Malawi, the NFIC Director could be prone to compromise his or her duty 
to investigate and gather financial intelligence in a ML case if it involves a senior government 
official or someone considered to be an ally of the President or Minister. This conclusion is drawn 
given that, although the appointment by the Minister of Finance is made in consultation with the 
AML Council, the NFICA does not provide the criteria which the Minister and the AML Council 
must follow in appointing the Director of the NFIC. 
3.5  Conclusion 
An overview of Malawi’s FIA, the SAFIC and the NFIC illustrates that the FIU’s in the three 
countries have the same underlying principal function. Despite the similar mandates, the three 
financial intelligence institutions differ in several other important ways. For example, while 
Malawi has placed the primary responsibility of investigating cases of ML on the FIA, the DPCI 
has the primary responsibility for the investigation of cases of ML in South Africa. Unlike South 
Africa that has a specialised institution to investigate ML and other economic crimes, Malawi 
assigns the primary responsibility of disseminating financial intelligence and the investigation on 
ML to the FIA.  
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An examination of the appointments procedure In Malawi shows how vulnerable the Director is 
to political manipulation. Namibia shows itself to be the exemplar on this front, as the Director’s 
appointment, though made by the Minister, takes place in consultation with the AML Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 54 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES THAT THE MALAWIAN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AUTHORITY HAS SO FAR IDENTIFIED 
4.1  Introduction 
Malawi’s FIA’s most recent report on the typologies of ML identifies the various methods used 
by criminals to disguise the illegal origin of funds.157  
Section 4 of the FCA empowers the Malawian FIA, inter alia, to conduct research into the trends, 
techniques and developments of ML in order to improve the detection, prevention and 
deterrence of ML. Since its establishment, the FIA has been writing official reports on ML. This 
chapter discusses some ML typologies that the FIA has identified as affecting Malawi.  
4.2  The Significance of Studying the Different Money Laundering Typologies 
ML in Africa is rife. Given the hugely cash-based and often informal economies, criminals in Africa 
are able to move dirty money across borders, concealing its source and making it appear to be 
clean. As many African countries are rich in either oil or precious stones, these commodities are 
frequently used to move funds around the continent. Considering that typologies of ML are ever 
changing, criminals become more innovative, finding ways to blindside the regulators and 
LEAs.158 
                                                          
157 Financial Intelligence Unit Typologies on money laundering in Malawi (2016) 13, Republic of Malawi.    
      Available at http://www.fiumalawi.gov.mw/Malawi%20Typologies%20%20Report%202016.pdf  
     (last visited on 5 March 2016). 
158 Norton Rose Fulbright Prominence of money laundering in Africa: Ten things to know (2014) at 2.  
 Available at www.nortonrosefulbrightt.com/knowledge/publications/chapter5_preview/381/3iie3075.pdf   
      (last visited on 4 March 2018).  
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ML cripples the economies of developing states as financial institutions lose the esteem of their 
customers and of foreign investors. Several initiatives have been launched to minimise ML, both 
in the world and in Africa specifically.159 
4.3       Money Laundering Typologies Identified by the Malawian FIA and the Action Taken  
4.3.1 Public Sector Fraud 
Sophisticated fraud in the public sector continues to rear its ugly head, and in the case of Malawi 
it involves criminal elements within the public sector and other people who exploit the 
government system for their personal gain. Criminals deliberately produce fake documentation 
to perpetrate fraud on the government and to get their hands on taxpayers’ money.160 
The FIA has discovered that incorrect and dishonest payments are being made out to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (hereafter SMEs) and individuals as payments for goods and services. 
The SMEs and individuals involved usually have direct links to the perpetrators at the office 
effecting the payments. The SMEs and individuals involved do not trade with the Malawi 
government, neither have they in the past rendered any service or delivered any goods to the 
government. Bank accounts of companies and individuals are used to place illegitimate funds into 
the lawful economy, after which the money is withdrawn in the form of various instruments or 
moved around the financial system.161 
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As a part of its mandate, the FIA relies on STRs and Large Currency Transaction Reports (hereafter 
LCTRs) received from financial institutions as some platforms to help uncover the syndicates and 
other irregular activities in government.162 
4.3.2 Over-Invoicing and Under-Invoicing of Goods and Services 
Trade-based Money Laundering (hereafter TBML) is another activity that undermines the 
economy of Malawi, contributing to the illicit flows out of the country. TBML is the process of 
disguising the proceeds of crime through the use of what appears to be legitimate trade 
transactions. This is usually achieved by misrepresenting the price, quantity or quality of 
imported or exported goods. In Malawi, examples of TBML include over-invoicing or under-
invoicing of goods and services.163 
The key driver of this technique is the misrepresentation of the price of goods or services to 
transfer additional value between an importer and exporter. A Malawian importer would collude 
with a supplier in another jurisdiction to over-charge on the invoice in order that the additional 
value remains in that jurisdiction. The additional sum could also be transferred elsewhere in 
another jurisdiction on behalf of the importer. Some of the Malawi Cashgate cases had 
characteristics of this nature for the purchase of high value items for security establishments.164 
The under-invoicing technique is used to benefit exporters by setting very modest prices for their 
goods in order that the difference be transferred to another jurisdiction. Both over- and under-
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164 Typologies on ML in Malawi (2016: 19). 
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invoicing negatively affect the foreign exchange regime and tax collections by the Malawi 
Revenue Authority (hereafter MRA).165  
Under TBML, criminals also use multiple invoicing of goods and services. This technique involves 
issuing more than one invoice for the same transaction thereby justifying multiple payments. 
Companies have multiple bank accounts in the financial system and they use several financial 
institutions to make these additional payments, which makes these transactions even harder to 
detect.166  
The Reserve Bank of Malawi has set measures to curb the malpractice of over-invoicing and 
under-invoicing, but the problem is that trade finance is more document-intensive than many 
banking activities. Invoicing is more susceptible to documentary fraud, which can be linked to 
ML.167 Money launderers use fake official documents of the tax authorities and freight agencies 
to ply their trade.  
4.3.3 Use of Personal Accounts to Evade Tax 
There are cases where a businessman registers a business but opens the account in his own name 
instead of the name of the business. All the proceeds from the business are deposited into the 
personal account. It becomes difficult for the authorities to assess the tax obligations of the 
business because the account is not in the name of the business.168 
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In addition, foreign nationals are required to possess a Business Resident Permit (hereafter BRP) 
in order to do business in Malawi. They are also allowed to jointly register a business and obtain 
a BRP under the registered business name. However, although the business is jointly registered 
the foreigners do business individually. Though this may have been done to facilitate the 
acquisition of the BRP, it is also a way of avoiding tax obligations because the account of the 
registered business is usually less active than the personal accounts of the partners.169 
In dealing with cases where personal accounts have been used to evade tax, the FIA has in the 
past disseminated the cases to the MRA for further investigations. The MRA calculates the taxes 
and penalties payable to those found to have contravened the law.170 
4.3.4 Use of Alternative Remittance Systems-Hawala system 
Hawala is an informal system for transferring money, especially across borders, in which local 
agents disburse or collect money or goods on behalf of friends, relatives or other agents without 
legal protection or supervision, trusting that all remaining obligations will be settled through 
future transactions. Hawala can also be referred to as an underground banking system based on 
trust among the parties concerned in the remitting of the money value. What is moved is the 
value of the money, not the money itself. Terrorists are known to be extensive users of the 
system.171 
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In Malawi, hawala has manifested itself in various forms. It is used mainly by ordinary persons 
transferring modest monetary value. However, recent cases show that huge sums of money 
(value) are being exchanged using this system.  
What is worrying is that some local businesses,  usually foreign owned, operate as agents, paying 
out funds in Malawi Kwacha and getting the foreign currency equivalent paid into their  foreign 
accounts. This practice is detrimental to accounting for remittances from Malawians in the 
diaspora, which could contribute to Malawi’s foreign currency reserves. The practice robs the 
revenue authorities of the taxes due to them. Local companies that are involved in under-
declaration of turnover and profits to the MRA use this method to externalise their profits.172 
4.3.5 Forex externalisation 
Between January and November 2017, Malawi lost MK5.4 billion (about $7.4 million) due to 
illegal foreign exchange externalisation. Forex externalisation is taking of money, which is not the 
legal tender of that country, outside the country.173  A transaction analysis conducted by the FIA 
and the RBM on business accounts maintained by some non-Malawian nationals revealed that 
huge sums of illicit funds are laundered through Malawi’s banks. The illicit funds move under the 
guise of import payments being made by what appears to be legitimate businesses.174 In the 
                                                          
172 Typologies on ML in Malawi (2016: 26-27). 
173 Externalisation: Legal Instruments needed to enforce, clarify amnesty (9 March 2018), The Independent 
 in Main News, Politics. Available at https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/03/09/externalisation-
 legal- instruments-needed-enforce-clarify-amnesty/ (last visited 1 November 2018). 
174 Phiri G Forex Externalisation Costs Malawi MK5.4 billion (27 April 2018), The Nation Online Media. 
 Available at https://mwnation.com/forex-externalisation-costs-malawi-k5-4bn/  
 (last visited on 9 October 2018). 
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process of the unscrupulous externalisation, companies also shun paying dividends and 
corporate taxes to the MRA.175 
Most of the companies involved in forex externalisation make huge cash deposits followed by 
immediate requests for funds transfers to firms in various jurisdictions. The requests for funds 
transfers are mostly supported by forged or fake customs importation documents, the aim being 
to circumvent RBM Exchange Control Regulations.176 
The RBM has conceded that Malawi loses huge sums of money through forex externalisation. It 
recently disclosed that Malawi lost about MK719.32 billion (about $980 million) to illegal foreign 
currency externalisation and transfer pricing.177  This prompted the RMB to initiate ways of 
curbing the malpractice. The RBM is working on bringing about a new foreign exchange system 
which will require companies to obtain approval from the central bank before making huge 
payments for goods obtained outside Malawi. It is believed that such a requirement will help to 
monitor companies and hold them accountable.178 
The RBM avers that all cases involving illegal externalisation of forex in Malawi involve Pakistani 
nationals, causing speculation that some of the money laundered is used to fund terrorist groups. 
                                                          
175 Kumwembe W Reserve Bank of Malawi worried over externalisation (1 March 2018), The Times Group. 
      Available at https://www.times.mw/reserve-bank-of-malawi-worried-over-externalisation/  
 (last visited on 9 October 2018) 
176 Phiri G (27 April 2018). 
177 Transfer pricing is where an entity conducting economic activity in two countries uses internal transfer 
 prices to shift taxable income from countries of high taxation to countries of low taxation. (McSkimming S 
 “Trade Based Money Laundering: Responding to an Emerging Threat” (2010) at 44 Deakin Law Review  
Volume  15 No 1). 
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The FIA and the RBM have taken to court about 13 cases against Indian companies operating in 
Malawi, all involving forex externalisation.179 
In practice, it seems as though the FIA and RBM do not have a clue as to how to stop the frequent 
illegal externalisation of foreign currency. Huge sums of money continue to leave the banking 
industry to Asian countries and elsewhere. It is therefore questionable if the FIA and the RBM 
have really taken stringent exchange control measures to curb the malpractice. About a decade 
ago, a commercial bank in Malawi was shut down due to flouting exchange control regulations, 
illegal externalisation of forex and ML activities. Since then, there has never been any action by 
the RBM or the FIA against commercial banks to stop the malpractice.180 
Some argue that the banks and traders involved in ML and the illegal externalisation of forex 
need to face the full brunt of the law as these criminal acts are ruining the Malawian economy. 
The FIA and the RBM need to work together to ensure that criminals are put behind bars.181  
It is submitted that the FIA and the RBM are not doing enough to curb the externalisation of 
forex. What is needed is efficient coordination and intelligence exchange on suspicious 
transactions among the FIA, RBM and other financial agencies. The study recommends a review 
of Malawi’s Exchange Control Act so that it provides stringent measures to make forex 
                                                          
179 Mtika C Asians risk lengthy jail in Forex Externalisation cases involving MK58 billion (21 August 2018), 
 Nyasa Times. Available at http://investigative-malawi.com/498/4-asians-risk-lengthy-jail-in-forex-
 externalisation-case-involving-k5bn/ (last visited 9 October 2018). 
180 Mtonga L Hold Malawi Commercial Banks Accountable for Illegal Externalisation of Forex (last visited 7  
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externalisation difficult. The law should provide for hefty fines against commercial banks involved 
in illicit forex transactions. Furthermore, legislation should ensure that companies involved in 
such practices are not allowed to proceed with business as usual.  
4.3.6 Use of Bank/Transfers and Third Parties 
Another emerging trend is the use of bank cheques to distance money launderers from proceeds 
of crime. Banks need to know of the potential for ML through the use of bank cheques. Many 
individuals and businesses have legitimate reasons for using bank cheques for their transactions, 
but these cheques can be used to launder illicit funds or proceeds of crime.182 
There has been a rise in the use of bank cheques for transactions that would ordinarily have used 
other instruments, such as personal cheques, to conduct the transaction. A bank cheque is 
attractive to criminals as it shields the persons conducting the transaction. Bank cheques have a 
tendency of only showing up at the banks that have drawn the cheque. The receiving bank 
normally registers them as a deposit from another bank with the assumption that Know Your 
Customer and other due diligence measures have been duly done by the drawer bank. Money 
launderers may buy bank cheques to pay into their own accounts maintained at other banks.183 
Furthermore, unwitting third parties may also be used to receive wire transfers and, in turn, order 
bank cheques or transfers to other banks for the benefit of the perpetrators. Usually, there will 
be a sudden, unexplained increase in account activity, both from cash and from non-cash 
transactions. An account may be opened with a nominal balance that subsequently increases 
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rapidly and significantly. There may be many small or large incoming wires or multiple monetary 
instruments deposited into an account. The customer then requests a large outgoing wire to 
another bank account. The customer may also order bank cheques in favour of a third party.184  
4.4  Conclusion 
This chapter’s principle focus was to discuss the ML methods that the FIA has identified as 
affecting Malawi. Considering that launderers makes use of increasingly sophisticated methods  
to avoid being caught, it is crucial  for Malawi’s FIA to be continuously abreast of  the new 
techniques and find the most effective way of dealing with the issues. Despite the various ML 
typologies that have crippled Malawi’s economy, the chapter has focused on public sector fraud, 
use of personal accounts to evade tax, over/under invoicing goods and services,  forex 
externalisation, the use of alternative remittance systems (hawala) and the use of bank 
cheques/transfers and third parties. The chapter, however, has established that Malawi’s FIA and 
related LEAs are at sixes and sevens when it comes to coping with, especially, TBML. As a result, 
criminals continue to defraud the country’s financial system.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 General Conclusion 
FIUs have proved to be important in the fight against ML globally. Their importance cannot be 
dispensed with if AML laws are to be successfully enforced in all countries. However, countries 
may differ on the model type of FIU, depending upon what the various FIUs are meant to achieve 
under their respective enabling laws. Regardless of the form that an FIU may take, the core 
function of any FIU is to receive and analyse STRs and disseminate the resulting financial 
intelligence to other LEAs.  
The study examined the effectiveness of the Malawian FIA in combating ML. It discussed the FIA’s 
mandates, the process for appointing the Director General and Deputy Director and the funding 
for the FIA. One of the findings is that Malawi’s FIA’s powers are restricted to the investigation 
and dissemination of financial intelligence that it receives. It has no authority to prosecute ML 
cases.  
This paper has also revealed that Malawi’s FCA makes the FIA amenable to political or executive 
interference, given that the Minister of Finance and the President are key in the appointment of 
the Director General. What is more, there is overt political interference in the workings of the 
FIA, as has become evident in the Malawi Police Food Supply Contracts and the Cashgate Scandal. 
For example, as has already been noted in the preceding chapters, the Malawi FIA failed to seize 
the office building meant for the DPP which President Muntharika purchased using alleged 
proceeds of corruption. Malawi’s experience from the two case studies is proof of violation of 
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Recommendation 29 of the FATF, requires that FIUs be operationally independent. 
Independence is indispensable for the effective operation of FIUs as it guarantees that the 
institution has the power to work freely and to make autonomous decisions based on the STRs it 
receives.  
Malawi’s FIA was compared with analogous South African and Namibia bodies. Although the FIUs 
in all three countries showed similarities and vulnerabilities to political interference, the 
Namibian FICA is singled out for being the most trustworthy in its workings. The NFICA is 
applauded because the NFIC’s Director is appointed by the Minister of Finance after consultations 
with the AML Council. The involvement of the AML Council suggests that there is an independent 
non-political body, with the power to oversee the appointment of the Director. 
In view of the weaknesses pointed out above, the following recommendations are made with 
respect to Malawi’s FIA: 
5.2        Recommendations 
5.2.1        Amending Section 5 and Section 6 the FCA 
5.2.1.1 Section 5 of the FCA 
Section 5 of the FCA gives the Malawi FIA wide-ranging powers, which is a commendable 
improvement on the repealed ML Act of 2006. As noted, the FCA does not vest the FIA with 
prosecutorial powers, only investigatory authority. Another deficit revealed in this paper is that 
most of the Malawian prosecutors in the other LEAs are ill-equipped to prosecute ML cases. As a 
result, most ML charges either fall away or take an excessively long time to be prosecuted.  
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Malawi’s ACB has the power to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.185 Similarly, MRA also 
has the authority to investigate and prosecute tax related offences in Malawi. This paper 
advocates that section 5 of the FCA be amended to empower the FIA to prosecute ML offences 
in cases it finds it appropriate to prosecute with prior authorisation from the office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions.   
The study further proposes that the FIA should have a prosecution department through which 
completed investigations of ML will be handed over to the prosecutors for further action. This 
will ensure finality to ML cases as coordination within the FIA will be easier. Furthermore, there 
will be speedy prosecutions as perpetrators will be prosecuted by staff who are well trained in 
the law of financial crimes, particularly in AML law.  
In the alternative, the study recommends that the FCA should compel the Malawi Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs under the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to have 
a specialised department of a team of prosecutors responsible for the prosecution of economic 
crimes, particularly ML cases. The Director of Public Prosecutions should ensure that the team of 
prosecutors in the financial crimes department are adequately trained in ML cases. The FIA must 
ensure that it makes thorough investigations, so that when the file is submitted for prosecution 
to the specialised team of prosecutors, a conviction of ML is sustained.  
Where the FIA’s role ends at investigations by passing on the ML file to other LEAs, it is doubtful 
that the FIA ever has a chance to follow up on the progress of the case. In that regard, this paper 
recommends that section 5 of the FCA further mandates the FIA to facilitate the enforcement of 
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the law against ML by empowering the FIA to follow up cases before the court and see why, for 
example, the ML charges are not being pressed by the prosecutors, and if they are being 
sustained, why the accused was acquitted. This insight could help the FIA hand over cases to the 
prosecutor that have a high prospect of success. Furthermore, the money launderer cannot 
escape punishment simply because a court might not convict him. One way of preventing this 
from happening is to subject judges, too, to training in handling ML cases. Another way is to 
proceed by way of civil asset forfeiture, where the standard of proof is proof on a balance of 
probabilities. This would make it easier for the LEAs to punish money launderers who would 
otherwise not be brought before a criminal court. 
Malawi should engage a team of experts from ESAAMLG to train prosecutors on the required 
skills for a successful prosecution of ML cases.  This will ensure that there is speedy prosecutions 
of ML as perpetrators will be prosecuted by staff who are well trained in the prosecution of 
financial crimes, particularly in AML law.  
If many ML cases are prosecuted in Malawi, potential money launderers will be deterred from 
engaging in economic crimes, thus saving Malawi from incurring further economic loses through 
the unscrupulous conduct of money launderers. 
5.2.1.2 Section 6 of the FCA 
For the FIA to be independent, it is important that the President should not be given the authority 
to appoint the Director General. Empowering the President to make such an appointment 
invariably places the Director General under an obligation to implement decisions which favour 
him or his allies. In Malawi, where most money laundering crimes are perpetrated by politically 
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connected people, it is even more important for the President not to appoint the Director 
General of the FIA single-handedly. An objective appointment made by a politically independent 
body would ensure that the Director implements the dictates of the FIA without fear or favour, 
and then be required to account and respond to questions put to him or her. 
5.2.2 Improved Coordination between Malawi’s FIA and other LEAs  
Since the FCA places the primary duty to combat ML upon the FIA, the FIA should assume an 
active role by participating regularly in meetings and conferences with the other LEAs so that 
knowledge is shared among all the relevant institutions. Obviously, the FIA cannot combat ML by 
itself. Scheduling regular meetings with other role players would help to lessen the mistrust 
among the institutions. This would help to improve the flow of communication, thus enhancing 
transparency on the kind of financial intelligence received from the reporting entities. 
5.2.3 Regular Parliamentary Oversight Meetings with the FIA 
The study recommends that Malawi’s Parliament, through the PAC and the Parliamentary 
Committee on Finance, conduct regular accountability checks on the FIA. Parliament, together 
with the proposed AML Council, would need to ensure that the various departmental managers 
of the FIA are made to appear before it to answer questions regarding the manner in which it 
deals with STRs reported to it by banks and other reporting entities. Frequent monitoring of the 
work of the FIA would help to ensure that the FIA’s employees refrain from neglecting their 
statutory duties. 
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